Anthropic SI enterprise WIDE CHAT bridge (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources, ends 25 Apr 2027)
$585KAnthropic SI enterprise WIDE CHAT bridge (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources, ends 25 Apr 2027)
Other large contracts
$114KClaude enterprise software licensing. (Smithsonian Institution, ended 19 Oct 2026)
$19KState contract (State, ended 12 Mar 2026)
From its IPO filingS-1/A, 17 Nov 2026
Defense
“The LTBT is intended to operate as an independent body of financially disinterested trustees with expertise in AI safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise. Through a special class of common stock, Class T common stock, the LTBT generally has the authority to elect and remove the Class T directors, who together will constitute a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors.”
“The LTBT is intended to operate as an independent body of five financially disinterested voting trustees ("Trustees") with expertise in super intelligence safety, national security, public policy, and social enterprise. Through a special class of common stock, Class T common stock, the LTBT generally has the authority to elect and remove the Class T directors, who together will constitute a majority of the authorized members of our board of directors.”Long-Term Benefit Trust
“Any military conflict, tariffs and trade restrictions, economic coercion, blockade, natural disaster, or other incident affecting Taiwan could severely disrupt the global supply of advanced chips, with effects that could persist for years given the time required to construct and qualify alternative fabrication facilities. Efforts to establish sufficient advanced chip manufacturing capacity outside of Taiwan, including in the United States, remain in early stages and may not produce adequate compute to materially reduce these concentration risks within the foreseeable future.”Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure adequate compute.
“In addition, certain equipment, such as high-voltage transformers, switchgear, turbines, generators, substations, and transmission components, has been subject to extended delivery timelines, price increases, tariffs and national security requirements, and allocation constraints as demand from data center operators and other large electricity consumers has grown. If such equipment is delayed or unavailable, we may be able to replace it only at higher prices or under less favorable long-term commitments.”Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure adequate compute.
Export controls
“Additionally, the U.S. government has imposed and may continue to impose export controls restricting the sale of advanced chips and chip manufacturing equipment to certain countries, including China. These restrictions have affected global chip and related equipment supply allocation, and future changes in export control policy could affect the availability or pricing of the compute resources on which we rely.”Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure adequate compute.
“Governments and regulatory authorities in the United States and in other countries in which we operate or distribute our models, platform, and applications have proposed, enacted, or are considering legislation, regulations, and guidance relating to AI model development and deployment, data usage and privacy, transparency, safety, consumer protection, content generation, intellectual property, cybersecurity, export controls, and competition.”Our business is subject to an evolving and uncertain regulatory and political environment, which could increase our costs, restrict our operations, or adversely affect demand for our models, platform, and applications.
“Our models, platform, and applications are subject to U.S. export controls, and our current or future models, platform, and applications may be controlled under the Export Administration Regulations administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce or, in more limited circumstances, under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the "ITAR") administered by the U.S. Department of State.”Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions, customs requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting privileges or limit our ability to compete in certain markets.
“Compliance with applicable export controls may delay the introduction or sale of our models, platform, and applications outside the United States, restrict our customers’ ability to deploy our models, platform, and applications globally, inhibit our ability to engage in certain research and development activities, limit the performance of our models, platform, and applications, or prohibit exports to certain jurisdictions altogether. Such restrictions have already affected our offerings directly.”Governmental trade controls, including export and import controls, sanctions, customs requirements, and related regimes, could subject us to liability or loss of contracting privileges or limit our ability to compete in certain markets.
Government customers
“Additionally, the U.S. government has imposed and may continue to impose export controls restricting the sale of advanced chips and chip manufacturing equipment to certain countries, including China. These restrictions have affected global chip and related equipment supply allocation, and future changes in export control policy could affect the availability or pricing of the compute resources on which we rely.”Constraints on the critical inputs supporting compute could limit our ability to secure adequate compute.
“For example, in September 2025, we detected and assessed with high confidence that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group manipulated our Claude Code tool into attempting infiltration into roughly 30 global targets, including large technology companies, financial institutions, chemical manufacturing companies, and government agencies, resulting in a limited number of successful intrusions. We believe this is the first documented case of a large-scale cyberattack executed without substantial human intervention.”The political environment and our engagement with policymakers and public positions on AI regulation and safety could subject us to heightened scrutiny, political backlash, or disproportionate regulatory action.
“For additional risks related to our reliance on enterprise customers and government customers, including longer sales cycles, complex procurement processes, heightened contractual, compliance, and security requirements, and budgetary and policy constraints, see the sections titled "—Sales to enterprise customers involve complexities and risks that could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations" and "—Our sales to government entities and highly regulated organizations are subject to challenges and risks."”We derive substantially all of our revenue from a limited number of products and applications, and our failure to maintain and expand our product portfolio could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
“Further, in June 2026, the U.S. federal government issued an executive order establishing a voluntary framework for developers of frontier models to engage with the government prior to the deployment of such AI technologies, directing federal agencies to strengthen cyber defenses, and prioritizing enforcement against criminal misuse of AI; although that framework is voluntary and does not establish a mandatory governmental licensing, preclearance, or permitting requirement for the development or deployment of AI models, it reflects increasing federal attention to the national security implications of frontier intelligence and the order may be followed by further executive or legislative a…”
AI regulation
“Concerns have been raised both within our organization and by other researchers, regulators, policymakers, and industry participants that sufficiently advanced AI systems could, if not developed, deployed, and operated with appropriate safeguards, oversight, and security measures, pose catastrophic or existential risks to humanity, particularly if such systems were misused, replicated, weaponized, or allowed to operate with a high degree of autonomy.”Risk Factors
“Our commitment to responsible and safe AI development includes active engagement with policymakers, regulators, and other stakeholders regarding the development of AI-related laws, regulations, and standards.”The political environment and our engagement with policymakers and public positions on AI regulation and safety could subject us to heightened scrutiny, political backlash, or disproportionate regulatory action.
“Harms associated with our AI models, whether arising from misuse by third parties, from our models’ own behavior, or from their deployment in high-risk or sensitive contexts, may expose us to liability, litigation, and regulatory action, including under theories that remain unsettled as applied to AI, and our contractual and insurance protections may prove insufficient.”The political environment and our engagement with policymakers and public positions on AI regulation and safety could subject us to heightened scrutiny, political backlash, or disproportionate regulatory action.
“We have in the past changed, and we expect that in the future we may change, our pricing models, including as a result of competition, macroeconomic conditions, compliance with increased regulatory hurdles, the maturation of the market for AI models, platforms, and applications, or changes in how our models, platform, and applications are broadly consumed. As a result, we may be required to reduce our prices, offer shorter contract durations, or offer alternative pricing models, such as outcome- or task-based pricing, any of which could adversely affect our business.”Our pricing structures for our models, platform, and applications change from time to time, which could adversely affect our business, financial condition, and results of operations.
Revenue, in its own words
“In 2023, 2024, and 2025, our revenue was $41 million , $386 million , and $4.6 billion , respectively, representing year-over-year growth of 841% in 2024 and 1,088% in 2025. In the nine months ended September 30, 2026 , our revenue was $33.2 billion , representing a year-over-year growth rate of 1,206% .”We are at an early stage of our revenue growth, we have experienced rapid growth in recent periods, and our historical growth rates are not indicative of future performance or our ability to sustain or forecast future revenue growth.
“For example, the number of our employees increased from approximately 940 as of December 31, 2024 to approximately 5,300 as of September 30, 2026, and our revenue increased from $197 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024 to $17.0 billion for the three months ended September 30, 2026. This growth has placed, and may continue to place, a significant strain on our management and our operational and financial resources.”If we fail to manage our growth effectively, our brand, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adversely affected.
“From September 30, 2025 to September 30, 2026, TTM revenue increased approximately 1,200 % while headcount increased approximately 170 % , driving TTM revenue per employee from $1.4 million to over $6.6 million , a reflection of extraordinary talent density and a culture built to compound it .”Operating Efficiency
“Our revenue was $33.2 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 , up from $2.5 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 . Our operating loss was $1.3 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2026 , down from $5.2 billion for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 .”Operating Efficiency
Supply chain risk
“At the same time, the Secretary of War directed the Department of War to designate us as a "supply-chain risk to national security" and stated that "effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity" with us. On March 4, 2026, the Department of War sent us two letters—one pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and the other pursuant to Section 4713 of the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act ("FASCSA")—asserting that our models, platform, and applications present a supply-chain risk.”Our sales to government entities and highly regulated organizations are subject to challenges and risks.
“On September 25, 2026, in a 2-1 split decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied our petition for review, ruling that the Department of War’s Section 4713 supply-chain risk designation was proper, and that our rights under the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment were not violated. We filed a petition for rehearing en banc asking the full D.C. Circuit to review the panel’s decision.”Our sales to government entities and highly regulated organizations are subject to challenges and risks.
“At the same time, the Secretary of War directed the Department of War to designate Anthropic as a "supply-chain risk to national security" and stated that "effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity" with us. On March 4, 2026, the Department of War sent us two letters—one pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3252 and the other pursuant to Section 4713 of the FASCSA—asserting that our models, platform, and applications present a supply-chain risk.”Other Matters
“After first obtaining an order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that preliminarily enjoined the Department of War’s directive and Section 3252 supply-chain risk designation of us and preliminarily enjoined the other defendant agencies from implementing the Presidential directive until final resolution of the lawsuit, we subsequently, on August 27, 2026, obtained an order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California that largely granted summary judgment in our favor.”Other Matters
Other transaction agreements1 agreement · $2M obligated
Obligated (FPDS)
$2M
Agreement
1
Prototype and production agreements outside the contract rules. Reported to FPDS, not to USAspending. Obligated is money committed so far; value is the most FPDS records with all options.
$2MFrontier AI Anthropic Prototype · Office, Chief Digital & AI OfficerPrototype · signed 14 Jul 2025 · runs to 14 Jul 2027 · FPDS record
Our business is subject to an evolving and uncertain regulatory and political environment, which could increase our costs, restrict our operations, or adversely affect demand for our models, platform, and applications.